Mar 252013
 

Posted by greydogg, 99GetSmart

* WHY CYPRUS 2013 IS WORSE THAN KREDITANSTALT (1931) AND ARGENTINA 2001 CRISIS

By Martin Sibileau, View from the Trenches

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The Cyprus 2013, like any other event, can be thought in political and economic terms.

Political analysis: Two dimensions

Politically, I can see two dimensions. The first dimension belongs to the geopolitical history of the region, with the addition of the recently discovered natural gas reserves. The historical relevance goes as far back as 1853, the year the Crimean War began. The Crimean War took place in the adjacent Black Sea, but the political interest was the same: To avoid the expansion of Russia into the Mediterranean. The relevance of this episode was the break-up of the balance of power established after the Napoleonic Wars, with the Congress of Vienna, in 1815. From then on, a whole new series of unexpected events would lead to a weaker France, a stronger Prussia, new alliances and a final resolution sixty years later: World War I.  It is within this same framework that I see Cyprus 2013 as a very relevant political event: Should Russia eventually obtain a bailout of Cyprus (as I write, this does not seem likely) against a pledge on the natural gas reserves or a naval base, a new balance of power will have been drafted in the region, with Israel as the biggest loser.

The second political dimension refers to a point I made exactly a year ago, precisely inspired in the KreditAnstalt event of 1931. In an article titled: “On gold, stocks, financial repression and the KreditAnstalt of 1931” I wrote:

“(The KreditAnstalt event) was triggered because France, a public sector creditor, introduced a political condition to Austria, in exchange for a bailout of the KreditAnstalt. Today, like in 1931, in the Euro zone, the public sector is increasingly the creditor of the public sector. In 1931, England and France were creditors of Austria and demanded conditions that no private investor would have demanded.

Private investors live and die by their profits and losses. Politicians live and die by the votes they get. Private investors worry about the sustainability and capital structure of the borrower, the collateralization and the funding profile of their credits. Politicians worry about the sustainability of their power. It’s a fact and we must learn to live with it.

In 2012, Greece and increasingly other peripheral EU countries owe to other governments, the IMF and the European Central Bank. Private investors have been wiped out and will not return any moment soon. We fear that just like in 1931, when the next bailout is due either for Greece again or Portugal or Spain, political conditions will be demanded that no private investor in his/her right mind would ever have demanded. Think of it…What in the world had the customs union between Austria and Germany in 1931 had to do with the capitalization ratio of the KreditAnstalt??? Nothing! Yet, millions and millions of people worldwide were condemned to misery in only a matter of days as their savings evaporated! Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the world of fiat currencies! You have been warned! If months from now you read in the papers that the EU Council irresponsibly demands strange things from a peripheral country in need of a bailout, remember the KreditAnstalt. Remember 1931.

Please, understand that this is not a tail risk. The tail risk is precisely the opposite. The real tail risk here is that when the next bailout comes due, politicians think like private investors and give priority to economic rather than political considerations. That’s the tail risk! If such a crisis occurred, the media will speak of increased correlations and tell you that everything is actually fine on this side of the Atlantic. But if you read us, you will know that all that led to such a situation was perfectly foreseeable and nothing is really fine on this side of the Atlantic either. You will have remembered 1931…” […]

READ @ http://sibileau.com/martin/2013/03/24/why-cyprus-2013-is-worse-than-the-kreditanstalt-1931-and-argentina-2001-crisis/

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* THE MORNING AFTER

By Tyler Durden, zerohedge


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Having soared in a kneejerk response to news of the Cyprus deal which was a replica of what had been expected to take place last Friday, and thus largely priced in, it was not surprising to see the EURUSD gradually drift lower in the overnight session, printing below 1.30 at last check (and the Cyprus euphoria was not enough to push Shanghai green(. And while S&P futures ramped alongside the carry pairs early in the overnight session, the ramp has so far been contained, as the recently re-carried USDJPY pair has also refused to take out the 95.00 level in an upward direction.

In terms of events, as UBS points out, all eyes should remain focused on Cyprus today, especially since there is no data being reported elsewhere. Financial markets closed Friday on a positive note, as an agreement on Cyprus appeared to be taking shape and a minor relief rally across most asset classes overnight vindicated hopes of a positive outcome as details of the detail were announced overnight. More clarity is still required on some aspects of the agreement (deposit and bondholders) but the fact that the national parliament does not need to vote again should stop the deal from unravelling as it did last week. Whether this is enough to restore confidence and prevent a possible cautionary deposit flight from Cyprus remains to be seen.

However, the key variable now remains Russia, whose first deputy PM Shuvalov said is waiting for final Cyprus deal before reacting; does not rule out renegotiating Cyprus loan. If anyone can tip the boat on Europe now, it is Russia. […]

READ @ http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-03-25/morning-after

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* CYPRUS KEPT IN THE EURO, BUT AT WHAT COST?

Source: OpenEurope

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Summary: The most positive aspect of last night’s deal was that a deal was reached at all, and that some steps have been taken to counter moral hazard. However, overall, this is a bad deal for Cyprus and the Cypriot population. Cypriot GDP is likely to collapse in the wake of the deal with the possible capital controls hampering the functioning of the economy. The large loan from the eurozone will push debt up to unsustainable levels while the austerity accompanying it (along with the bank restructuring plan) will increase unemployment and cause social tension. There is a strong chance Cyprus could become a zombie economy – reliant on eurozone and central bank funding, with little hope of economic growth. Meanwhile, the country will remain at the edge of the single currency as tensions increase between members with Germany, the ECB and the IMF now looking intent on a more radical approach to the crisis.

The eurozone took this one down to the wire. But late last night, after a week of intense back and forth negotiations, a deal was reached on the Cypriot bailout. Below we lay out the key points of the deal (the ones that are known, there are plenty of grey areas remaining) and our key reactions to the deal.

Key points of the deal:

  • Laiki bank will be fully resolved – it will be split into a good bank and bad bank. The good bank will merge with the Bank of Cyprus (which will also take on Laiki’s circa €8bn Emergency Liquidity Assistance – a last-resort funding system outside the usual ECB operations). The bad bank will be wound down over time with all uninsured depositors (over €100,000) taking significant losses (no percentage yet but some could lose all their money above the threshold).
  • The Bank of Cyprus will be recapitalised using a debt to equity swap and the transfer of assets from Laiki. Uninsured depositors will take large hits in this process – again no percentage but reports suggest up to 40%.
  • These actions will be taken using the new bank restructuring plan passed in the Cypriot Parliament on Friday. Crucially, no further vote will be needed in the Cypriot parliament since there is no direct deposit levy.
  • The banks will not receive any of the €10bn bailout money, the entire recapitalisation will be done using the tools outlined above.
  • Not clear when the banks will reopen but significant capital controls are likely to be in place, creating a risk of Cypriot euros being “localised”.
  • Further tax increases may be included in the detailed plan to be drawn up between the two sides. […]

READ @ http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/LIVE?id=11128&page=FlashAnalysis#

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* EU MINISTERS APPROVE PLAN TO BAILOUT CYPRUS

Source: youtube

VIDEO @ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOV_VIzCfMk

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